Certainly, Western tanks drive better in reverse, they will give a lot to the Ukrainians

It is important to keep in mind that what was revealed on Wednesday is just the beginning. The West needs to begin arming Ukraine with everything if it doesn't want Russia to triumph, as it seems to be doing.

ranging from carbines to tanks to airplanes. There isn't any other option.

Making political decisions will come with maturity and time. Contrary to appearances, these machines are very similar. At this time, we have moved past the light weapons, artillery, and anti-aircraft weapon stages and are in the stage of tanks and infantry fighting vehicles.

The announcement on Wednesday regarding the deliveries of Leopard 2, M1 Abrams, and Challenger 2 tanks paves the way for the formation of entire heavy Ukrainian brigades outfitted with Western weapons. ranging from artillery to infantry fighting vehicles to tanks.

Even a small number of these brigades could cause significant harm to the Russians at the front in the future with properly trained crews, coordinated during exercises, and good supplies supported by NATO. The armament of such units will be superior to that of the Russians and unquestionably higher than the pre-war Ukrainian standard in the West, where it is frequently almost the best that is available.

the M1 Abrams tank's turbine needs to be replaced. The Leopard 2 has a comparable feature.

The engine and gearbox are two components that can be changed in a day or two. public domain Only when comparing them to automobiles of Soviet origin, which were developed under noticeably different presumptions, can significant differences be seen.

The level of expertise between western and eastern engineers did not differ significantly. They merely performed their duties within the parameters set forth by the client, i.

e. within the limits of their nation's technological capabilities and the army.

Soviet tanks, and subsequently modern Russian and Ukrainian tanks, were smaller, lighter, and simultaneously well armored (smaller area to cover - relatively less heavy armor) and had a high rate of fire, but they also had inferior observation and fire control systems (Soviet optics and electronics), were less mobile, and were more challenging to operate for both crew and technicians. The role of the individual in the Eastern system was simply diminished.

The West believed that the efficiency of the tank would be significantly improved by a crew that was possibly rested, well-covered, and comfortable. Position for viewing the Leopard 2A5 tank of Poland.

Although the interior of the tanks is difficult to photograph due to its confined space, when compared to the T-64 and T-72 machines and their derivatives, the western tanks' interiors are almost spacious. The idea that the tanks coming from the east will crush everything and the tanks coming from the west will sink in the muck is a myth, according to Mieczyslaw Michalak of Agencja Wyborcza.

Because the weight, length, and width of the tracks are better matched, there is less pressure on the surface of NATO tanks. Additionally, Western cars have more potent engines (the standard set by Abrams and Leopards is 1,500 hp, compared to about 1,000 hp for the Russians, giving Western cars a better power-to-weight ratio despite the difference in weight).

The superior quality and dependability of their gearboxes, which also allow for quick reverse driving, which is crucial on the battlefield when you need to retreat and hide, is another great advantage of western machines. The mainstay of the Russian armored forces, the T-72 and its derivatives, can only travel backwards at a few kilometers per hour (NATO vehicles can travel at speeds of up to 30 kilometers per hour).

One drawback frequently mentioned by eastern tankers is the inability to swiftly leave a dangerous situation. Turning the vehicle over exposes the poorly armored rear to fire, which is a requirement if they want to escape.

The Soviet allies were merely convinced that they needed to launch an immediate attack on the people in the west. Tanks should be well-equipped for effective ambush combat because NATO believed that a flexible defense against these masses would be essential.

It is advantageous in this situation to be able to lower the cannon's barrel lower than in eastern cars, which is made possible by larger turrets and their distinctive construction. This allows a western tank to position itself advantageously—for instance, behind a hill—and fire from there, exposing only the turret with the thickest armor.

A problem with engines and the entire power transmission system has also always existed in the USSR and continues to do so. In actuality, the drive used in the most recent Russian T-90M is a direct evolution of what was developed in the 1930s for the T-34.

There have been numerous unsuccessful attempts to create brand-new alternatives. The T-64 tank drive, which is the Ukrainian standard but is still seen as too difficult and urgent in the USSR, is the only attempt that has been somewhat successful.

Contrary to popular belief, Western tanks are less likely to break down and are simpler to fix than Soviet technology, which is said to be impervious to all damage and repairable with a hammer. One-on-one meetings are unlikely.

It would be preferable to see which of them ends up on both sides in tank-on-tank battles to determine what would transpire. There would be no competition, for instance, if the Russian side had an outdated T-72B with barely functional optics and the ex-German Leopard 2A6 (almost the most modern variant) on the Ukrainian side.

However, if the roles were reversed and the most modern Russian T-90M and the outdated Spanish Leopard 2A4 met, the Western machine might experience significant difficulties. That is how starkly the quality of the machines varies depending on the model.

Only such one-on-one tank battles can be considered truly original in this conflict. First off, tanks fight together very infrequently when they are properly used.

Second, they are now being used very carefully due to the large number of lethal anti-tank missiles in the hands of the infantry on both sides. There is no question that there won't be any action-movie-style battles between tanks.

It's more of a jump and run shooting style from cover and at a distance as great as possible. And under such circumstances, the superior Western observation and fire control systems, the more precise cannons, as well as the improved ability to fire from cover and quickly retreat, can be worth their weight in gold.

This does not, however, represent a guarantee. There will undoubtedly be a lot of Western tanks that explode in Ukraine.

The Russians have a ton of equipment, including laser-guided artillery shells and Kornet anti-tank missiles, which can easily destroy an Abrams or a Leopard, so there are no magic weapons, despite the fact that they lack miracle weapons. The Western logistics that support these machines is also very important to the Ukrainians, in addition to the Western machines' purely combat capabilities.

For Ukrainian logisticians and mechanics, maintaining supplies and performing proper maintenance on a variety of Western tank types—along with their various variants—will undoubtedly present a significant challenge. However, they will manage because of the war, the fact that money is not an issue, and the lack of a choice.

But more importantly, the west has a large supply of 120mm tank ammunition as well as an inventory of spare parts (although some of the older Leopard 2 models have issues). Because Ukrainians have needs that outweigh available supplies and production, 125 mm caliber machines are the norm in the east, and this ammunition is currently among the most sought-after worldwide.

Additionally, because Ukrainian tankers lacked access to the most advanced Russian variants created in the 1990s and later, they have so far had rather subpar armor-piercing ammunition. The West is able to give the Ukrainians high-quality shells for their 120 mm cannons, posing a lethal threat to Russian automobiles.

In the long run, it is precisely this transition to Western equipment, which the West can maintain much better, that is most important for Ukraine. Logistics and industry win wars. Because it was left over from the Warsaw Pact and lacks a solid industrial foundation, the dominant eastern equipment does not have a future.

This issue is of utmost significance because the war could last for another year. The Ukrainians' current use of equipment from the east may collapse at that point in time in a sizable portion.

It's more difficult to rearm yourself this way because the Russians aren't giving up weapons as readily as they were at the beginning of the war. Tanks (about 100) and infantry fighting vehicles (American M2 Bradley and German Marder, together about 140) can be used to field an armored and mechanized brigade in the first echelon, as the West has already declared.

140 wheeled armored vehicles with a combined capacity of up to two motorized brigades (American Stryker, French AMX-10). In addition, a large number of new anti-aircraft and artillery systems were promised.

The new brigades are most likely to enter combat in late spring or early summer at the earliest because deliveries and training will take several months. This will serve as the new Ukrainian armed forces' core, which will have a western-style appearance.

They might be assembled into a corps that would be very helpful in liberating the occupied areas. It is possible to anticipate future NATO heavy equipment deliveries as well as the gradual formation of new brigades.

Long-range missiles and contemporary combat aircraft are absent from the entire set. It is certain that in the coming months, the Ukrainians will also possess this equipment as a result of ongoing discussions on the subject.

The Ukrainian armed forces at the end of this war will probably look very different than they did at the beginning thanks to Western assistance.

The idea that the tanks coming from the east will crush everything and the tanks coming from the west will sink in the muck is a myth, according to Mieczyslaw Michalak of Agencja Wyborcza.